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ABSTRACT
Prediction markets aggregate agents’ beliefs regarding a future
event, where each agent is paid based on the accuracy of its reported
belief when compared to the realized outcome. Agents may strate-
gically manipulate the market (e.g., delay reporting, make false
reports) aiming for higher expected payments, and hence the ac-
curacy of the market’s aggregated information will be in question.
In this study, we present a general belief model that captures how
agents influence each other beliefs, and show that there are three
necessary and sufficient conditions for agents to behave truthfully
in scoring rule based markets (SRMs). Given that these conditions
are restrictive and difficult to satisfy in real-life, we present novel
strategy-proof SRMs where agents are truthful while dismissing all
these conditions. Although achieving such a strong form of truth-
fulness increases the worst-case loss in the new markets, we show
that this is the minimum loss required to dismiss these conditions.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sciences—
Economics; I.2.11 [Distributed Artificial Intelligence]: Multia-
gent Systems
General Terms
Theory, Algorithms, Economics
Keywords
Prediction Markets, Scoring Rules, Mechanism Design
1. INTRODUCTION
Prediction markets have been used widely as a powerful tool to
elicit the beliefs of agents about a future event; see [23, 24, 21, 6].
In such markets, an agent reports a probability distribution (i.e., an
estimate) over the set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive possi-
ble outcomes of a future event. When the outcome of this future
event is realized, the agents are paid based on the accuracy of their
reports when compared to the realized outcome. It has been shown
that prediction markets produce better estimates for future events
compared to polls and expert opinions [2, 24].
Given that agents are paid based on their reports, an agent can
maximize its expected payoff by strategically manipulating the mar-
ket (e.g., delaying its report, and/or making false reports), and here,
the accuracy of the market’s aggregated information will be in ques-
tion. This fact highlights the fundamental relation between predic-
tion markets and mechanism design [9, 6].
∗Corresponding author. Email: ayman.ghoneim@anu.edu.au; ay-
man.a.sabry@gmail.com.
In mechanism design [17], eliciting the private information of
agents is required to determine an outcome that reflects their con-
flicting interests, where an agent’s private information defines its
value of each possible outcome for the problem. However, a pre-
diction market problem differs slightly from a mechanism design
problem in the sense that eliciting the agents’ private beliefs is the
end goal and no outcome will be determined. The prediction mar-
ket problem is more close to an interdependent valuations mech-
anism design problem [18] (i.e., an agent’s value of an outcome
depends on the private information of other agents in addition to
its private information) than a classical mechanism design prob-
lem (i.e., an agent’s value of an outcome depends only on its pri-
vate information), since a realistic model for the prediction market
problem – as the one we consider here – should assume that an
agent’s belief (therefore its report and expected payoff) is influ-
enced by other agents. Without such influence, scoring rule based
markets 1 (SRMs) [14, 15] are merely considering the report of the
last participating agent, and may not converge to a final estimate
that encapsulates the wisdom of the crowd.
In both mechanism design problems and prediction markets, truth-
fulness is achieved under a game-theoretic solution concept (i.e., a
truth-telling equilibrium) such as dominant strategy (i.e., strategy-
proof ) which is the strongest form of truthfulness where an agent
will be truthful even if other agents are not, or ex-post incentive
compatibility which is a weaker form of truthfulness where an agent
will be truthful if and only if all other agents are truthful. Unlike
mechanism design problems, prediction markets normally operate
at a loss that is considered the price for aggregating the agents’
beliefs. Several studies have addressed the strategic behavior of
agents in prediction markets. They can be categorized as follows:
1. Adopting a game theoretic perspective that views the market
as a game and investigates its truth-telling equilibrium under
different models, such as conditionally dependent or inde-
pendent beliefs of agents [7, 11, 3, 20], betting games [19]
and decision making markets where an outcome will be de-
termined based on the aggregated information [4];
2. Investigating agents’ strategic behavior empirically by eval-
uating the effect of manipulators [16];
3. Adopting a mechanism design framework that produces a
mechanism rather than a market where agents not only re-
port their beliefs but also report the reasons behind their be-
liefs [9].
To the best of our knowledge, there have been no attempts to
design prediction markets which maintain a stronger form of truth-
1Also known as market scoring rules (MSR). We use the “scoring
rule based markets" terminology since it is more expressive.
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fulness compared to existing markets. In this study, we define a
general belief model that captures any possible influences between
the agents either inside or outside the market. We show that there
are three sufficient and necessary conditions for traditional (i.e.,
presently known) SRMs to be truthful. These conditions are the
predefined participation order condition (i.e., agents report their
beliefs to the market in a predefined order), the one participation
and market influence condition (i.e., an agent can report only once
and can influence other agents’ beliefs only by this single report),
and the non-negative influence condition (i.e., an agent assumes
that being influenced by other agents’ beliefs doesn’t decrease its
expected value). Given that these conditions are very restrictive
and difficult to satisfy in real-life, we present novel strategy-proof
SRMs that achieve truthfulness while dismissing all the previous
conditions. However, there is a trade-off between achieving such a
strong form of truthfulness and the payments made to the agents,
since these strategy-proof prediction markets make additional pay-
ments compared to traditional SRMs. We investigate dismissing
each condition separately to evaluate its contribution to the mar-
ket’s loss, and we show that these losses are the minimum pos-
sible losses to relax the previous conditions. Also, we show that
our contribution can be extended to cost function based markets
(CFMs) [5]. In the next section, we define the prediction market
problem and our belief model. In section 3, we discuss scoring
rules and SRMs. In section 4, we define solution concepts for truth-
fulness and the necessary and sufficient conditions for SRMs to be
truthful. In section 5, we present the strategy-proof SRMs and ex-
tend our work to CFMs. Section 6 concludes the study.
2. PREDICTION MARKETS
Problem Statement. Consider a future event X that has a set
Ω = {1, . . . , N} of mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcomes,
and a set of agents who have privately known beliefs regarding that
future event. Each agent’s belief is a probability distribution (i.e.,
an estimate) p = [p1, . . . , pN ] over the set Ω of all possible out-
comes for the event X , where pi is the agent’s probability that the
outcome i ∈ Ω will be realized. Let ∆N = {p ∈ RN : 0 ≤
pi ≤ 1,∑Ni=1 pi = 1} be the probability simplex that contains all
possible probability distributions p. Assuming that it is required
to obtain information about the event X by eliciting the agents’
beliefs regarding that event, a market maker may establish a pre-
diction market where agents can report their probability estimates
and get paid based on the accuracy of their reports when compared
to the realized outcome i for the event X .
Belief Model. There are several ways to model agents’ reason-
ing in prediction markets. We propose a belief model which focuses
on how agents influence each other’s beliefs. Our belief model cap-
tures such influence by assuming that each agent receives two sig-
nals (i.e., probability estimates). The first signal is a private signal
pprv , which represents the agent’s own reasoning about the future
event without any external influences. The second signal is a public
signal ppub, which represents the influence of other agents, either
through their reports inside the market or through announcements
and discussions outside the market. This public signal is the only
way an agent is influenced by other agents. Each agent receives
a predefined private and public signals, and thus, the agent cannot
affect their contents. However, an agent can influence the public
signals of other agents as we will show later.
Given the agent’s private and public signals, the agent needs to
form a final true belief p about the future event. To do that, the agent
must decide whether to use its public signal ppub along with its pri-
vate signal pprv to produce it final belief p or to consider its private
signal as its final true belief (i.e., p = pprv). As we will show later,
this decision depends on what the agent thinks about how its public
signal ppub will affect its expected payoff. Each agent has a prede-
fined merging function M : ∆N ×∆N → ∆N that the agent will
use if it decided to incorporate its public signal ppub to produce its
final belief p, i.e., the merging functionM(pprv, ppub) = pmerges
the agent’s private and public signals – in an arbitrary but prede-
fined way – producing the final belief p. For each agent, its pprv ,
ppub, andM(pprv, ppub) are predefined and privately known to the
agent, i.e., the agent’s private type is 〈pprv, ppub,M〉. Each agent
knows nothing about the types of other agents, and types may dif-
fer from one agent to another. We assume that each agent receives
only one private signal and only one public signal, and we will later
discuss relaxing this assumption.
Figure 1 summarizes an agent’s reasoning about reaching its final
belief p as we discussed earlier, and then, the agent needs to decide
whether it will participate in a truthful manner or manipulate the
market as we will discuss below.
Figure 1: An agent’s reasoning in the proposed belief model.
Truthfulness and Manipulation. Different types of prediction
markets use different protocols for how agents express their beliefs
in the market and how agents get paid. For instance, in SRMs,
agents report their beliefs directly to the market and get paid using
a particular scoring rule. While in CFMs, agents trade securities
(e.g., a ticket that pays $1 if a particular outcome i is realized and
$0 otherwise) in the market and their beliefs are inferred from their
trading behavior. Describing a prediction market in terms of its pro-
tocol (i.e., how it works) only provides a partial picture of the mar-
ket’s dynamics, since in order to elicit the agents’ beliefs quickly
and accurately other conditions (e.g., when and how many times
agents will participate in the market) are imposed to guarantee that
agents will behave truthfully.
Definition 1. An agent behaves truthfully if once it receives its
private signal pprv and public signal ppub, it uses its merging func-
tion M(pprv, ppub) to produce its final belief p and it reports p to
the market without any delays.
However, an agent may manipulate the market either intention-
ally if this increases its expected payoff, or due to irrational, ma-
licious, or any other behavior that contradicts the rationality as-
sumption (i.e., an agent never behaves in a way that decreases its
expected payoff). We define market manipulation as follows.
Definition 2. An agent can manipulate the market by: 1. delay
reporting its true belief p = M(pprv, ppub); 2. reporting a false
belief p′ 6= p; and/or 3. misleading other agents either by par-
ticipating more than once in the market and reporting false beliefs
p′ 6= p, or by spreading false information outside the market 2.
2We don’t detail how agents interact outside the market since how
an agent is affected by other agents is encapsulated in the public
signal the agent receives.
When the market is manipulable, the accuracy of the market’s
aggregated information will be in question. Similar to mechanism
design, truthfulness is achieved in prediction markets under a game-
theoretic solution concept, and we define two solution concepts in
the prediction markets context as follows.
Definition 3. A prediction market achieves truthfulness in
Dominant Strategy (also known as strategy-proofness): For any
rational agent, being truthful (Definition 1) always maximizes the
agent’s expected payoff even if other agents are manipulating the
market (Definition 2).
Ex-Post Incentive Compatibility (also known as ex-post Nash):
For any rational agent, being truthful (Definition 1) maximizes the
agent’s expected payoff if other agents are rational and truthful
(Definition 1).
We consider truthfulness in ex-post incentive compatibility to be
an unrealistic solution concept for real-life applications in spite of
its frequent usage in the mechanism design literature, because as-
suming that an agent – who has the ability to behave strategically –
will assume that other agents are truthful is unreasonable. Strategy-
proofness is the strongest and most preferred form of truthfulness,
since an agent will not manipulate the market irrespective of other
agents’ behavior. Moreover, achieving strategy-proofness is moti-
vated by the fact that it is not always possible to assume that all
involved agents are fully rational.
3. SCORING RULE BASED MARKETS
Hanson [14, 15] introduced SRMs as markets for aggregating
the agents’ estimates, where scoring rules are used to pay agents
for their reported beliefs.
Scoring Rules. Scoring rules have been used extensively in
aggregating and evaluating the accuracy of reported probabilistic
forecasts regarding future events [12]. A scoring rule is a func-
tion s : ∆N × Ω → [−∞,∞]. Given a probability distribution
p ∈ ∆N , a scoring rule s(p) = [s1(p), . . . , sN (p)] assigns a score
si(p) that takes a value in the extended real line [−∞,∞] for each
outcome i ∈ Ω. The score si(p) serves as a reward (penalty) that
the agent will receive (pay) for predicting the distribution p, and
the outcome i was realized. From now on, we will use p to de-
note the probability estimate that reflects the true belief of an agent,
and p′ to denote the probability estimate that the agent will report,
which may or may not be equivalent to p. Given a scoring rule s,
an agent’s expected payoff from reporting p′ while having a true
belief p is E(s, p, p′) =
∑N
i=1 pisi(p
′).
A regular scoring rule is a scoring rule where an agent’s expected
payoff E(s, p, p′) takes a value in [−∞,∞) for all p, p′ ∈ ∆N , and
the expected payoff E(s, p, p) for reporting the true estimate p takes
a value in (−∞,∞). This implies that si(p) is finite whenever
pi > 0. A proper scoring rule is a scoring rule where a risk neutral
agent has no incentive to report any distribution p′ other than its
true belief estimate p, i.e., E(s, p, p) ≥ E(s, p, p′), ∀p, p′ ∈ ∆N .
The scoring rule is said to be strictly proper if the previous in-
equality holds with equality only when p = p′. Let b > 0 and
a1, . . . , aN be parameters. An example of a regular strictly proper
scoring rule is the logarithmic scoring rule [13]:
si(p) = ai + b ln(pi). (1)
Given a proper scoring rule s, we can define an uncertainty func-
tion and a discrepancy function [10]. The uncertainty function
S(s, x) =
∑N
i=1 xisi(x) for x ∈ ∆N measures the uncertainty
(i.e., lack of precision) associated with the distribution x. When an
agent faces a proper scoring rule s, the uncertainty function S(s, p)
is equal to the agent’s maximum expected payoff E(s, p, p) that re-
sults from reporting its true belief p. The discrepancy function
D(s, x, y) =
N∑
i=1
xisi(x)−
N∑
i=1
xisi(y) (2)
for any x, y ∈ ∆N measures the distance between the two distri-
butions x and y using the scoring rule s as the metric for measure-
ment (i.e., the distance differs accordingly with the s in use). This
distance reflects the difference between the uncertainty associated
with x and the uncertainty associated with y compared to x.
Scoring Rule Based Markets. A scoring rule based market
(SRM) can be viewed as a sequentially shared proper scoring rule
s that works as described in Procedure 1. The market always keeps
a current probability estimate pc, which is defined by the market
maker when the market begins by an initial estimate p0 (Step 1).
Until the market closes (Steps 2-5), any agent can change that cur-
rent estimate pc to its reported estimate p′ (Step 3). The market
maker saves the initial estimate and all the reported estimates in a
vector θ (Steps 1 and 4). The market’s closing (i.e. the last) current
estimate represents the market’s elicited information from all the
agents. Once outcome i is realized, each agent who made a report
p′ receives si(p′) and pays si(pc), where pc is the current market
estimate that immediately precedes the agent’s report (Steps 6-9).
Procedure 1 SRM Protocol.
1: m← 1, t← 0, pc ← p0 and θ(t)← pc.
2: repeat
3: An agent j reports an estimate p′ and pc ← p′.
4: t← t+ 1 and θ(t)← p′.
5: until Market closes and outcome i is realized.
6: while m ≤ t do
7: p′ ← θ(m), pc ← θ(m− 1) and m← m+ 1.
8: The payment of agent j who reported p′: si(p′)− si(pc).
9: end while
In a SRM that uses a proper scoring rule s, if an agent’s true
belief estimate is p and it changed the market current probability
estimate pc to p′, then its expected payoff is
E(s, p, p′, pc) =
N∑
i=1
pi(si(p
′)− si(pc)). (3)
Prediction markets normally run at a loss, at least theoretically.
The market maker’s loss is the price it pays to elicit the agents’
beliefs about the future event. In SRMs when outcome i is real-
ized, each agent pays si(pc) for the immediate previous report pc,
which is the same amount si(p′) received by the agent who re-
ported p′ = pc. Thus, all the intermediate payments to and from
the agents offset each other, and the market maker is left with re-
ceiving si(p0) from the first participating agent and paying si(p′)
for the last participating agent who reported p′. But because any
outcome i ∈ Ω can be realized, and the last report p′ can be any
estimate in the simplex ∆N , the market maker’s worst case loss
(WCL) is
max
i∈Ω
sup
p∈∆N
(si(p)− si(p0)), (4)
where p0 is the initial estimate. In Eq. 4, si(p) − si(p0) reflects
the highest possible price that the market maker will pay for its
additional gained knowledge compared to its initial estimate p0,
given any possible outcome i.
Example 1. A software house wants to predict the probable re-
lease date of a certain software, either in March (outcome A) or in
June (outcome B), and will establish a logarithmic SRM (LSRM)
that uses a logarithmic scoring rule (Eq. 1) with ai = 0, ∀i ∈ Ω
and b = 1. The market starts by an initial estimate p0 = [pApB ] =
[0.5 0.5] where pA and pB are the probabilities that outcomes A
and B will be realized, respectively. To illustrate how this LSRM
works, Table 1 shows the participating agents (Column 1), and for
each agent the table shows its true belief p (Column 2), its participa-
tion order (PO) (Column 3), the market’s current estimate pc when
it participated (Column 4), its reported belief p′ (Column 5), and its
expected payoff (EP) (Column 6). According to Table 1, we have
agent 1 and agent 2, and both are truthful (i.e., reported p′ = p).
Agent 1 participated first, and changed the current market estimate
pc = p0 = [0.5 0.5] to p′ = [0.4 0.6], and its expected payoff 3
will be 0.0201. Then, agent 2 participated and changed the current
probability pc = [0.4 0.6] to p′ = [0.7 0.3], and its expected payoff
will be 0.1838.
Agent 2 is a programmer who can’t affect the software’s release
date, and we will illustrate how he came up with his final belief p.
Once he heard about this market, he formed his own belief pprv =
[0.8 0.2]. However, after a discussion with colleagues over lunch,
he became aware of some technical problems facing the develop-
ment team, and he knew that the project manager responsible for
this software was on a sick leave. Furthermore, the programmer
observed a previous report [0.4 0.6] made to the market (i.e., agent
1). To capture all these external effects – other than the agent’s
initial belief pprv , we assume that agent 2 receives a public signal
ppub = [0.45 0.55]. We stress that agent 2 can’t affect the content
of its public signal, e.g., the agent can’t choose which colleagues
to talk to or which information it receives. However, an agent can
affect the public signals of other agents, e.g., the report of agent 1
affected the public signal of agent 2. We assume here that agent 2
thinks that using ppub to produce its final belief will increase its ex-
pected value, and it will use a predefined merging function to come
up with its final belief p. Agent 2 used a simple merging function
M ′(pprv, ppub) that works for an event with two outcomes as fol-
lows: the final belief p is pprv after increasing the probability of
the outcome that had a higher probability in ppub by 0.1, and de-
creasing the the probability of the other outcome by 0.1. Given that
outcome B (i.e., software released in June) has a higher probability
in ppub, then p = [(0.8-0.1) (0.2+0.1)] = [0.7 0.3] (i.e., the true be-
lief p of agent 2 in Table 1). It is clear here that the reported belief
of agent 2 is the final current estimate in the market which reflects
the elicited beliefs of all agents. If agents don’t influence the be-
liefs of each other (e.g., agent 2 wasn’t influenced by the report of
agent 1), then the market would only have elicited the belief of the
last participating agent.
Table 1: Example 1
Agent p PO pc p′ EP
1 [0.4 0.6] 1st [0.5 0.5] [0.4 0.6] 0.0201
2 [0.7 0.3] 2nd [0.4 0.6] [0.7 0.3] 0.1838
4. SRMS TRUTHFULNESS
Unfortunately, existing prediction markets don’t even achieve
truthfulness in ex-post incentive compatibility (Definition 3), and
3The expected payoff is approximated to four-decimals precision
and is calculated using Eq.4 given p, p′ and pc: (0.4)[ln(0.4) −
ln(0.5)] + (0.6)[ln(0.6)− ln(0.5)] = 0.0201.
they operate under restrictive and unrealistic conditions to achieve
truthfulness. In SRMs literature and prediction markets in general,
it is stated that an agent will be truthful (Definition 1) under my-
opic participation, i.e., “It is optimal for traders to report their true
beliefs provided that they ignore the impact of their reports on the
profit they might garner from the future trades ... [3]". Other stud-
ies (e.g., [7]) discuss truthfulness conditions more explicitly. Given
our belief model, we will require three separate conditions in order
to analyze and develop strategy-proof prediction markets.
Definition 4. The SRM truthfulness conditions are:
1. Predefined Participation Order (PPO): Agents participate
in the market in a predefined order.
2. One Participation and Market Influence (OP-MI): Each
agent participates only once in the market, and can influence
the public signals of other agents only through its single re-
port (i.e., any external communication (e.g., discussions) is
not allowed).
3. Non-Negative Influence (NNI): Considering the public sig-
nal ppub doesn’t decrease the agent’s expected payoff.
The first two conditions are easy to understand, but the NNI con-
dition needs more elaboration. Consider the probability distribution
pnat defined by “nature" over the set Ω of all possible outcomes for
the future event, where pnat dictates the “real" probability that each
outcome i ∈ Ω will be realized. Considering any arbitrary market
current estimate pc in any SRM, the absolute (or global) maximum
expected payoff any agent can ever get in principle is attained by
changing pc to pnat. No agent knows the estimate pnat for cer-
tain, but each agent thinks that its true belief p = M(pprv, ppub)
is equal to pnat or at least hopes that p is very close to pnat, since
the closer p is to pnat the higher the agent’s expected payoff will
be. Given a proper scoring rule s, this can be expressed by the dis-
crepancy value D(s, p, pnat), where the smaller the discrepancy
value the closer is p to pnat. The NNI condition means that each
agent believes that when using its public signal ppub to produce
its true belief p, the true belief p is closer to pnat than pprv , i.e.,
D(s, p, pnat) ≤ D(s, pprv, pnat). This means that using the pub-
lic signal ppub to produce the final belief p has a non-negative influ-
ence on (i.e., doesn’t decrease) the agent’s expected payoff, as ppub
enhances the agent’s private belief pprv about the future event. We
stress that the NNI condition does not necessarily hold if all agents
are truthful (Definition 1), e.g., an agent may report its true belief,
but this belief will negatively influence other agents. That’s why we
state the NNI condition – whether other agents are truthful or not
– rather than stating an ex-post incentive compatibility condition
(Definition 3).
To show that the conditions in Definition 4 are necessary and
sufficient for agents in SRMs to be truthful (Definition 1), we will
show that by dismissing each condition separately, an agent can
maximize its expected payoff by manipulating the market (Defi-
nition 2). Then, we will show that if these three conditions hold
simultaneously, then an agent has no incentive to manipulate the
market.
Theorem 1. A SRM without the PPO condition is manipulable
even if the OP-MI and NNI conditions hold.
Proof. We prove this theorem using a counter-example 4 that
shows that a SRM is manipulable even when agents participate
only once, report their true beliefs and we neglect any influences
4It is sufficient to show that an agent has incentive to manipulate
the market given a particular private type of another agent, without
assuming that the agent knows the private type of that other agent.
between the agents’ beliefs (i.e., OP-MI and NNI conditions hold).
Consider Example 1, and assume that agents there participated in a
predefined order.
Table 2: Example 2.
Agent p PO pc p′ EP
2 [0.7 0.3] 1st [0.5 0.5] [0.7 0.3] 0.0823
1 [0.4 0.6] 2nd [0.7 0.3] [0.4 0.6] 0.1920
In Example 2 (Table 2), we assume that agent 1 has the chance
to report after agent 2. First, agent 2 changes pc = p0 = [0.5 0.5]
to p′ = [0.7 0.3], then agent 1 changes pc = [0.7 0.3] to p′ = [0.4
0.6]. Agent 1 expected payoff will be 0.1920, which is higher than
its expected payoff (i.e., 0.0201 in Table 1) when it participated
before agent 2. 
Theorem 2. A SRM without the OP-MI condition is manipulable
even if the PPO and NNI conditions hold.
Proof. We prove this theorem by using a counter-example (recall
Footnote 4) that shows that a SRM is manipulable when agents par-
ticipate in a predefined order (i.e., PPO condition holds) and when
agents believe that considering their public signals doesn’t decrease
their expected payoff (i.e., NNI condition holds). Using example 2,
agent 1 has – after considering its private and public signals – a
true belief of [0.4 0.6] and will report after agent 2 according to a
predefined order. Agent 2 has a private signal pprv = [0.7 0.3],
and considers the market current estimate as its public signal ppub.
Agent 2 uses the merging function M ′ of Example 1. As shown in
Table 2, the true belief p of agent 2 will be its private signal pprv =
[0.7 0.3], because the market current estimate pc = p0 = [0.5 0.5]
is the public signal and it doesn’t favor any outcome.
Table 3: Example 3.
Agent p PO pc p′ EP
1 [0.4 0.6] 1st [0.5 0.5] [0.51 0.49] −0.0042
2 [0.8 0.2] 2nd [0.51 0.49] [0.8 0.2] 0.1809
1 [0.4 0.6] 3rd [0.8 0.2] [0.4 0.6] 0.3819
In Example 3 (Table 3), agent 1 participates twice and makes
the first and third reports according to a predefined order. Because
agent 1 believes that its belief p = [0.4 0.6] is true, then it will
try – from its point of view – to maximize its expected payoff by
manipulating the public signal of agent 2 as follows. Agent 1 will
first change pc = p0 = [0.5 0.5] to [0.51 0.49]. Now the market
current estimate is [0.51 0.49], which is the public signal of agent
2 and it favors outcome A with probability 0.51. According to
the merging function M ′ of agent 2, its final true belief will be its
private signal pprv = [0.7 0.3] after adding 0.1 to the probability
of outcome A and subtracting 0.1 from the probability of outcome
B, i.e., [(0.7 + 0.1) (0.3 - 0.1)] = [0.8 0.2]. After agent 2 reports
its belief [0.8 0.2], agent 1 will change the market current estimate
pc = [0.8 0.2] to its true belief [0.4 0.6]. The net expected payoff
of agent 1 from its first and second reports is−0.0042 + 0.3819 =
0.3777, which is higher than its expected payoff 5 0.1920 when
reporting only once after agent 2 as in Example 2 (Table 2). Similar
to Example 3, an agent can gain from affecting the public signals
of other agents through communications outside the market. 
5Misleading other agents is not always beneficial, and an agent
must balance its loss when bluffing (e.g., agent 1 negative expected
payoff from its first false report) with its future gains.
Theorem 3. A SRM without the NNI condition is manipulable
even if the PPO and OP-MI conditions hold.
Proof. Relaxing the NNI condition implies that an agent will
believe that its public signal ppub doesn’t enhance its private be-
lief pprv , which means that considering ppub while formulating its
true belief p = M(pprv, ppub) may decrease its expected payoff,
i.e., D(s, pprv, pnat) < D(s, p, pnat) may hold. In this case,
the agent is better off by neglecting its public signal ppub, and
will report its private belief pprv . Reporting p = pprv and not
p = M(pprv, ppub) violates the agent’s truthfulness (Definition 1),
and is considered a strategic misreporting. This can happen under
the PPO and the OP-MI conditions. 
Theorem 4. In a SRM, the PPO, OP-MI and NNI conditions are
necessary and sufficient for agents to be truthful.
Proof. In theorems 1, 2 and 3, we showed that relaxing each
of the PPO, OP-MI and NNI conditions separately makes a SRM
manipulable, and thus, they are necessary conditions for achieving
truthfulness. We will now show that they are collectively sufficient
conditions by showing the effect of each condition. NNI Condition
Effect: an agent will assume that its public signal ppub doesn’t de-
crease its expected payoff (i.e., D(s, p, pnat) ≤ D(s, pprv, pnat))
and will use it to produce its final true belief p = M(pprv, ppub).
This will hold for any arbitrary merging functionM , since the NNI
condition encapsulated the effect of ppub on an agent’s expected
payoff regardless of M . PPO Condition Effect: an agent is partici-
pating in a predefined order and will be paid based on pc that will be
fixed according to this predefined order. OP-MI Condition Effect:
Given any estimate pc, the agent can’t influence pc because the
agent couldn’t have reported it, and the agent couldn’t have affected
the public signal of the agent who reported it. Given the effects of
the PPO and OP-MI conditions, the agent has no control over the
estimate pc based on which it will be paid and si(pc),∀i ∈ Ω in
Eq.4 are considered constants from the agent’s perspective. Given
the effect of the NNI condition and that a SRM uses a proper scor-
ing rule, reporting p′ = p maximizes the agent’s expected payoff
by maximizing
∑N
i=1 pisi(p
′). 
5. STRATEGY-PROOF SRMS
We will present strategy-proof SRMs that achieve truthfulness
in dominant strategy while dismissing all the previously mentioned
conditions. We will start dismissing one condition at a time to il-
lustrate the condition’s effect on the market maker’s WCL.
Relax PPO. Consider a SRM with any arbitrary proper scoring
rule s, it is easy to see in Eq. 5 that the agent’s expected payoff
E(s, p, p, pc) (i.e., Eq. 3) when changing the market current esti-
mate pc to its true belief (i.e., report p′ = p) is simply the discrep-
ancy function D(s, p, pc) of the proper scoring rule s (i.e., Eq. 2).
E(s, p, p, pc) =
∑N
i=1 pi(si(p)− si(pc)) (5)
=
∑N
i=1 pisi(p)−
∑N
i=1 pisi(pc) = D(s, p, pc)
This implies that in a SRM, an agent’s expected payoff is the dis-
crepancy distance between its report and the previous report made
to the market (i.e., the market’s current estimate pc). Thus, an agent
can maximize its expected payoff by choosing to go after the es-
timate pc that has the greatest discrepancy value compared to its
own report. We present an arbitrary participation (AP) SRM (Pro-
cedure 2) that works without the PPO condition, while an agent
will not benefit from delaying its report 6.
6We stress that an agent’s public signal is predefined and the agent
can’t affect the signal’s content by altering its participation time.
Procedure 2 AP SRM Protocol.
1: m← 1, t← 0, pc ← p0 and θ(t)← pc.
2: repeat
3: An agent j reports an estimate p′ and pc ← p′.
4: t← t+ 1 and θ(t)← p′.
5: until Market closes and outcome i is realized.
6: while m ≤ t do
7: p′ ← θ(m), compute p′c = argmax
pc∈θ
[
∑N
i=1 p
′
i si(p
′) −∑N
i=1 p
′
isi(pc)], and m← m+ 1.
8: The payment of agent j who reported p′: si(p′)− si(p′c).
9: end while
Theorem 5. Given an AP SRM, an agent will be truthful under
the OP-MI and NNI conditions.
Proof. The AP SRM (Procedure 2) is similar to a SRM (Pro-
cedure 1) except for Step 7. The NNI condition has the same ef-
fect as in theorem 4. The OP-MI condition has the same effect
as in theorem 4, and thus, the agent can’t affect the vector θ that
holds all the reported estimates to the market from its beginning
till its end. In an AP SRM, an agent is paid based on the esti-
mate p′c that maximizes its expected payoff given its reported es-
timate p′, where p′c is chosen from vector θ and has the greatest
discrepancy value compared to p′. In other words, the AP SRM
market will pay each agent assuming that it reported directly after
the pc that corresponds to the greatest discrepancy value compared
to the agent’s report p′. Thus, an agent has no incentive to de-
lay its participation time. By substituting p′c in Eq.4, an agent’s
expected payoff is E(s, p, p′, p′c) =
∑N
i=1 pi(si(p
′) − si(p′c)),
we can consider si(p′c), ∀i ∈ Ω as the constants that maximize
E(s, p′, p′, p′c). Given that an AP SRM is using a proper scoring
rule, reporting p′ = p maximizes the agent’s expected payoff by
maximizing
∑N
i=1 pisi(p
′). 
In principle, a SRM (Procedure 1) pays and receives payments
from every agent, but because the agents’ payments offset each
other (i.e., each agent pays what the previous agent receives), the
SRM pays only the last participating agent. This is not the case
anymore in an AP SRM, and what an agent pays is not what the
previous agent receives because p′c is not necessarily the previous
report made to the market. This implies that we must consider a
payment for each agent, and this increases the market’s WCL by
the factor of the number n of participating agents as follows.
n×max
i∈Ω
sup
p,pc∈∆N
(si(p)− si(pc)). (6)
However, this is the minimum WCL required to dismiss the PPO
condition as we now show.
Lemma 6. The AP SRM is truthful without the PPO condition
and has the minimum WCL.
Proof. In a SRM (Procedure 1) without the PPO condition, an
agent is free to choose its participation time. The maximum ex-
pected payoff an agent can get by altering its participation time is
by reporting after p′c that has the greatest discrepancy value com-
pared to its belief p. And thus, the minimum expected payoff that
prevents the agent from altering its participation time is to pay the
agent based on p′c, which is the AP SRM payment. 
Relax OP-MI. We present a non-myopic (NM) SRM (Proce-
dure 3) which works without the OP-MI condition, while an agent
will not benefit from participating more than once and/or mislead-
ing other agents. The NM SRM is similar to a SRM (Procedure 1)
except for Steps 6-9 concerning how agents are paid, and for Step 3
where agents report their private beliefs pprv along with their final
beliefs p = M(pprv, ppub). However, the market current estimate
pc changes according to the final beliefs. Let θprv denote the vector
that holds all reported private estimates.
Procedure 3 NM SRM Protocol.
1: pc ← p0.
2: repeat
3: An agent j reports an estimate p′, a private estimate pprv
and pc ← p′.
4: Add pprv to θprv .
5: until Market closes and outcome i is realized.
6: for all Participating Agents do
7: Let p′ be the last report by agent j made to the market,
and pprvc is the immediate previous private belief from
θprv reported to the market before p′ by any agent k 6= j
.
8: The payment of agent j: si(p′)− si(pprvc ).
9: end for
Theorem 7. Given a NM SRM, an agent will be truthful under
the PPO and NNI conditions.
Proof. The NNI condition has the same effect as in theorem
4. Without the OP-MI condition, an agent can get the maximum
expected payoff by: 1. report to the market again and again ev-
ery time it realizes that reporting yields a positive expected payoff;
and 2. by influencing the public signals of other agents for fu-
ture gains (e.g., example 3 in theorem 2), either inside the market
by making misleading reports or outside the market. For the first
point, the NM SRM eliminates the incentive to do this by paying
an agent based on its last report to the market (Step 7), and will
neglect all the agent’s previous reports. For the second point, the
NM SRM eliminates the incentive to do that by paying the agent
(Steps 7-8) based on the private beliefs of other agent which is
not affected by their public signals. Given the PPO condition and
that agent j is paid based on pprvc that was reported by another
agent k 6= j immediately before the last report made by agent
j, an agent can’t choose the pprvc which will be used in its pay-
ment. By substituting pprvc in Eq.4, an agent’s expected payoff is
E(s, p, p′, pprvc ) =
∑N
i=1 pi(si(p
′)−si(pprvc )), and given the pre-
vious, si(pprvc ), ∀i ∈ Ω are considered constants from the agent’s
perspective. Given that a NM SRM is using a proper scoring rule,
reporting p′ = p maximizes the agent’s expected payoff by maxi-
mizing
∑N
i=1 pisi(p
′). 
In NM SRM, the agents’ payments don’t offset each other, be-
cause each agent is paid by the market according to its report p′
(i.e., si(p′)) and pays the market according to pprvc (i.e., si(pprvc )),
and pprvc is not the p′ based on which the previous agent is paid.
This implies that we must consider a payment for each agent, and
this increases the market’s WCL by a factor of the number n of
agents (i.e., the same loss as in Eq.6).
Lemma 8. The NM SRM is truthful without the OP-MI condition
and has the minimum WCL.
Proof. Recalling the two points in the proof of theorem 7 about
how an agent can increase its expected payoff, the NM SRM avoids
the first point without an extra loss by paying an agent only for its
last report. For the second point, the NM SRM eliminated any
incentives for an agent from misleading other agents by paying it
according to the private beliefs of other agents. In SRM (Proce-
dure 1) without OP-MI, the maximum gain an agent can get is by
misleading the previous agent to report a pc that has the greatest
discrepancy value for the agent’s report p′. The minimum amount
to eliminate such an incentive for an agent to mislead another agent
is the WCL of the NM SRM. 
Relax PPO and OP-MI. We present an arbitrary participation
non-myopic (AP NM) SRM (Procedure 4) which works without
the PPO and the OP-MI conditions by combining the ideas behind
the AP SRM and NM SRM.
Theorem 9. Given an AP NM SRM, an agent will be truthful
under the NNI condition.
Proof. The proof here is similar to the proof of theorem 7. The
NNI condition has the same effect as in theorem 4, and paying an
agent according to the private beliefs of other agents has the same
effect as in theorem 7. However when we dismiss the PPO con-
dition, the agent can maximize its expected payoff by altering its
participation time to report p′ after the private signal pprvc that has
the greatest discrepancy value from p′. But similar to the AP SRM,
the AP NM SRM pays an agent based on p′′c that is chosen from all
the reported private estimates θprv\j of other agents and maximizes
the agent’s expected value given its report p′. Here, the agent has
no incentive to alter its participation time. Given that agent j can’t
influence the vector θprv\j , and by substituting p
′′
c in Eq.4, an agent’s
expected payoff is E(s, p, p′, p′′c ) =
∑N
i=1 pi(si(p
′)−si(p′′c )), and
we can consider si(p′′c ), ∀i ∈ Ω as the constants that maximize
E(s, p, p′, p′′c ). Given that an AP NM SRM is using a proper scor-
ing rule, reporting p′ = p maximizes the agent’s expected payoff
by maximizing
∑N
i=1 pisi(p
′). 
The WCL in an AP NM SRM is the same as the loss in an AP
SRM, but it pays an agent based on the estimate that maximizes the
agent’s expected payoff that is chosen from θprv\j rather than θj in
the AP SRM.
Procedure 4 AP NM SRM Protocol.
1: pc ← p0.
2: repeat
3: An agent j reports an estimate p′, a private estimate pprv
and pc ← p′.
4: Add pprv to θprv .
5: until Market closes and outcome i is realized.
6: for all Participating Agents do
7: Let p′ be the last report of agent j to the market, com-
pute the vector θprv\j from θ
prv to hold the reported pri-
vate beliefs of all agents except agent j, and compute
p′′c = argmax
p
prv
c ∈θprv\j
[
∑N
i=1 p
′
isi(p
′)−∑Ni=1 p′isi(pprvc )].
8: The payment of agent j: si(p′)− si(p′′c ).
9: end for
Lemma 10. The AP NM SRM is truthful without the PPO and
OP-MI conditions and has the minimum WCL.
Proof. Directly follows from Lemmas 6 and 8. 
Relax PPO, OP-MI and NNI. Finally, we present a strategy-
proof SRM (Procedure 5) that works without any conditions, and
agents will behave truthfully.
Theorem 11. Given a strategy-proof SRM, an agent will be
truthful.
Proof. Similar to the proof of theorem 7, any agent j is paid
only for its last report, and based on the private signals reported
by other agents, and thus, it has no incentive to participate more
than once and/or manipulate other agents’ public signals either in-
side or outside the market. When we dismiss the NNI condition,
an agent will not assume that using its public signal enhances its
private signal and may decide to neglect its public signal. To avoid
this, the strategy-proof SRM (Steps 7-8) pays agent j the maximum
amount when outcome i is realized according to either its reported
final belief p′ or its reported private signal pjprv
′
. Thus, the agent
doesn’t care about the implications of using its public signal. Agent
j is paid based on the private signals p1c and p2c in θ
prv
\j that corre-
spond to the maximum discrepancy value compared to the agent’s
reported beliefs p′ and pjprv
′
, and thus, the agent has no incentive
to alter its participation time. Given that agent j can’t influence the
vector θprv\j , and substituting p
1
c and p2c in Eq.4 results in two ex-
pected payoff equations E(s, p, p′, p1c) and E(s, pjprv, pjprv
′
, p2c),
agent j considers si(p1c) and si(p2c), ∀i ∈ Ω in both equations as
the constants that maximize these equations. Given that the mar-
ket is using a proper scoring rule, reporting p′ = p and pjprv
′
=
pjprv (where pjprv is the true private signal of agent j) maximizes
the agent’s expected payoff in the two equations by maximizing∑N
i=1 pisi(p
′) and by maximizing
∑N
i=1 p
jprv
i si(p
jprv′). 
Procedure 5 Strategy-proof SRM Protocol.
1: pc ← p0.
2: repeat
3: An agent j reports an estimate p′, a private estimate pprv
and pc ← p′.
4: Add pprv to θprv .
5: until Market closes and outcome i is realized.
6: for all Participating Agents do
7: Let p′ be the last report of agent j in the market,
pjprv
′
be the private belief of agent j reported with
p′, compute the vector θprv\j from θ
prv to hold the re-
ported private beliefs of all agents except agent j, com-
pute p1c = argmax
p
prv
c ∈θprv\j
[
∑N
i=1 p
′
isi(p
′)−∑Ni=1 p′isi(pprvc )],
and compute p2c = argmax
p
prv
c ∈θprv\j
[
∑N
i=1 p
jprv′
i si(p
jprv′) −
∑N
i=1 p
jprv′
i si(p
prv
c )].
8: The payment of agent j: max[(si(p′) −
si(p
1
c)), (si(p
jprv′)− si(p2c))].
9: end for
Again, the WCL in the strategy-proof SRM is same as that of the
AP SRM and the AP NM SRM.
Remark 1. We previously assumed that each agent receives only
one private signal and one public signal. Our work extends to sce-
narios where an agent receives its private and public signals and
reports to the market, and then receives new private and public sig-
nals and reports again to the market, as long as there is no strategic
interaction between the two reports (e.g., the agent is not waiting
to receive the new signals).
Remark 2. Our work extends to design strategy-proof convex
CFMs. In CFMs [5], the market maker trades a security for each
outcome i ∈ Ω that pays $1 if and only if outcome i was realized,
and $0 otherwise. Let qi denote the number of shares of secu-
rity i held currently by the agents, and q = [q1, . . . , qN ] denote
the vector of shares of all securities currently held by the agents
where q ∈ RN . The securities are priced based on a cost func-
tion C(q) : RN → R, which describes the amount of money
currently wagered in the market as a function of the quantity of
shares q held by agents. The instantaneous price of buying an in-
finitesimal amount of security i is given by pi(q) = ∂C(q)/∂qi.
Let p(q) = [p1(q), . . . , pN (q)] denote the vector of prices for all
the securities. An agent trades a bundle r = [r1, . . . , rN ] ∈ RN ,
where ri is the amount of shares purchased (or sold if negative)
from security i. When the agent purchases r, the agent pays the
market C(q+r)−C(q). Given an agent’s true belief p, the agent’s
expected payoff from purchasing r is E(C, p, q, r) =
∑N
i=1 piri−
(C(q + r) − C(q)). An agent maximizes its expected payoff by
buying a bundle r such that the prices in the market after this pur-
chase is equivalent to the agent’s true belief, i.e., p(q + r) = p.
In [8, Theorem 3], a one-to-one mapping was shown between
a set of convex CFMs and a class of strictly proper SRMs. This
mapping guarantees that an agent who changes the market current
estimate from pc to p in a SRM has exactly the same expected pay-
off for every outcome i ∈ Ω as the agent who changes the quantity
vector q to q+ r such that p(q) = pc and p(q+ r) = p in a convex
CFM. This equivalence guarantees that all the strategic behaviors
we indicated for SRMs and the measures taken to prevent them
still hold for convex CFMs. We just need to illustrate how the extra
payments in the strategy-proof SRMs are made in convex CFMs. In
strategy-proof convex CMFs, agents need to report their private sig-
nals along with their purchases. Once an agent purchases a bundle,
the market maker can realize the agent’s true belief by inspecting
the market’s prices after the purchase. After the market closes, the
market maker can determine at which point of time agent j would
have preferred to make its purchase in order to maximize its ex-
pected payoff based on the private beliefs reported by other agents.
Then, the market maker can issue (i.e., give for free) more securities
to agent j in order to equate its expected payoff from its purchase
with the expected payoff as expressed in any of the previous proce-
dures. In practice, this will increase the market maker’s loss. The
WCL of strategy-proof convex CFMs needs further investigation
since the WCL in traditional SRMs is bounded irrespective of the
number of participating agents and the equivalence in [8] doesn’t
state that this bound holds for any convex CFMs. The WCL is
bounded for a convex CFM if the conjugate of its C(q) is bounded
over the convex hull of the probability simplex [1, Theorem 3].
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We showed that designing prediction markets that have the strongest
form of truthfulness (i.e., strategy-proofness) is possible, but comes
with an unbounded WCL for SRMs. However, some commonly
used markets (e.g., CFMs) may have unbounded loss. Moreover,
assuming that markets will operate under very restrictive – and al-
most impossible to hold – conditions such as PPO, OP-MI or NNI
is unrealistic, e.g., how a market maker will guarantee the order of
the reports made to the market. As well, we have shown that this is
the minimum possible WCL required to dismiss these conditions.
This trade off between the money loss and achieving a strong form
of truthfulness is very common in mechanism design and in predic-
tion markets with more complicated settings (e.g., [22]). Extending
current ideas to other types of prediction markets appears fruitful
avenue of pursuit.
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